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JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
This is an appeal from the Order and Final Judgment of the Third Judicial District
Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, by the Honorable Pat B. Brian granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendants, dismissing the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. The
Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendants submit the following undisputed facts to supplement and, in certain cases,
to counteract the slant put on Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts.
1.

Plaintiffs' Statement of Fact No. 3 (Brief of Appellant, at 5) fails to disclose

that William Hatton, in his Affidavit (R. 145-146) acknowledges that Hattons and The Travel
Company were represented by an attorney in negotiating and entering into the Agreement for
the Purchase and Sale of The Travel Company's Assets ("Purchase Agreement").
2.

Plaintiffs Statement of Fact No. 7 (Brief of Appellant at 6) sets forth an

incorrect legal conclusion rather than a statement of fact. The exact language in the
Purchase Agreement, Section 2(c) is:
The Deferred Payment shall be evidenced by a promissory note
substantially in the form of Exhibit "A" attached hereto and
made part hereof. (R. 28).
Clearly, by this language, the actual note is not incorporated; instead, the form of the note is
specified.
3.

In Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts Nos. 13 and 14 (Brief of Appellant, p. 7),

Plaintiffs are attempting to infer, contrary to the allegations in Plaintiffs' Complaint referred
to below, that Plaintiffs were treating the Purchase Agreement and the "Promissory Note" as
1

being current through April 30, 1988:
a.

Paragraphs 33-40 of Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 5-6) speak of Morris'
claimed adjustment amounting to more than a $200,000 reduction in
principal due and Plaintiffs' rejection of Morris' claim and calculations.

b.

Paragraphs 43-46 and 80 of Plaintiffs Complaint (R. 8, 13)
speak of Morris' failure to provide a quarterly accounting and to pay
any "Earn Out Payments" which it was allegedly obligated to do
beginning July, 1985.

c.

Paragraphs 53, 54, 55, 57, 60, 64, 65, 89 and 91 of Plaintiffs'
Complaint (R. 9, 10, 11, 14 ) speak of a continuing default on interest
due and on Defendants' obligation to pay Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees.

d.

Paragraph 72 of Plaintiffs' Complaint (R. 11) seeks recovery of
$240,704.38 plus interest from April 30. 1985.

4.

In or about December, 1984, Morris offered to purchase the stock or the

assets of The Travel Company from the Hattons. Complaint, par. 9. (R. 3).
5.

William Hatton negotiated with Morris the terms of sale of the assets of The

Travel Company. Complaint, par. 10. (R. 3).
6.

Morris was ordered in William and Wanda Hatton's Decree of Divorce,

(Appendix 1), par. 10, to tender all future amounts owed under the Morris Note and Morris
Agreement to The Travel Company, in care of Wanda Hatton's attorneys, Fox, Edwards,
Gardiner & Brown. (R. 243).
7.

After the break up of the firm of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown, Morris,

2

by letter from its counsel, Thomas E. Kelly of Holme, Roberts & Owen to William Hatton's
attorney, Jan C. Graham of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, dated January 5, 1988
(Appendix 2), expressed the difficulty of not knowing to whom payment should be tendered
and took the position that it would only tender payment upon joint instruction of Bill and
Wanda Hatton. (R. 2).
8.

In its January 5, 1988 letter (Appendix 2), Morris reminded Jan C. Graham,

in response to her demand for payment under the Promissory Note, that the payee under the
Note was not William Hatton, but The Travel Company. (R. 141-142).
9.

Morris made it clear in its January 5, 1988 letter to Jan C. Graham that it

intended to promptly pay the entire remaining balance that it believed was owed under the
Promissory Note. (R. 141-142).
10.

By letter dated January 15, 1988, from Morris' attorney Richie D. Haddock to

William Hatton's attorney, Janet C. Graham, Morris tendered $84,295.62, the amount it
asserted in the letter constituted the remaining principal balance due under the Promissory
Note and $8,196.95, the amount it asserted in the letter constituted the accrued interest on
the Promissory Note. (R. 111-112).
11.

Plaintiffs acknowledge receipt of a principal payment of $84,295.62 and

interest payment of $8,647.41 in February, 1988. Complaint, par. 62. (R. 10).
12.

Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, The Travel Company retained its

accounts receivable existing as of April 28, 1985. Purchase Agreement, par. 14.
(R. 48).
13.

The Travel Company had ongoing responsibilities and commitments under the
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terms of the Purchase Agreement. See, e.g. par. 16 Survival of Representations and
Warranties and par 17 Further Assurances. (R. 50-51).
14.

In an Agreement dated February, 1987 entered into in connection with

Hatton's divorce settlement (Appendix 3) (the "Divorce Agreement"), by sworn affidavit,
William Hatton acknowledged The Travel Company as the holder of a note receivable from
Morris and as the beneficiary of certain provisions in an Agreement for the Purchase and
Sale of Assets between Morris and The Travel Company. Divorce Agreement, 1 D.
(R. 210).
15.

In the Divorce Agreement, William Hatton acknowledged the possible

necessity or advisability of litigating certain provisions of the Promissory Note and the
Purchase Agreement. Divorce Agreement, 1f E. (R. 210).
16.

In the Divorce Agreement, the "Travel Company Funds" were defined as those

funds which were originally owed to The Travel Company under the Morris Note or the
Morris Agreement which had not at that time been distributed to William Hatton or Wanda
Hatton. Divorce Agreement f 1(b) (R. 210).
17.

In an Assignment dated February, 1987, executed and sworn to by William

Hatton on February 9, 1987 (the "Divorce Assignment"), (Appendix 4) the Promissory Note
was acknowledged to have been executed by Morris Travel in favor of The Travel Company.
Divorce Assignment, 1 1(a). (R. 215).
18.

In the Divorce Assignment, the term "Disputed Installments" was used to refer

to those installments due under the Promissory Note which Morris disputes, said installments
falling due beginning on January 31, 1988 and continuing through April 30, 1990 in the total
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approximate principal amount of $241,000. Divorce Assignment, 1 1(c). (R. 215). The
Divorce Agreement (Appendix 3) and the Divorce Assignment (Appendix 4) are sometimes
hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Divorce Settlement Documents."
19.

Depending on the subsequent performance of the accounts purchased by

Morris from The Travel Company, The Travel Company could have been entitled to
additional payments or the amount to be paid to The Travel Company by Morris could have
been reduced. Purchase Agreement, paragraphs 3(a), 4, 4(a)-4(e). (R. 29-32). Promissory
Note. (R. 54-55).
20.

Pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note (R. 54-55), Morris Travel was

obligated to make quarterly payments to The Travel Company for specified but adjustable
amounts; and the Promissory Note expressly authorized prepayment "in whole or part at any
time without penalty." Complaint, 11 16, 21, 24, 25, and Complaint, Exhibit B. (R. 4, 5 &
54-55).
21.

Until approximately February 10, 1987, William A. Hatton was the sole

shareholder of The Travel Company. Complaint, 1 67. (R. 11 ).
22.

On or about February 10, 1987, fifty percent of The Travel Company's stock

was transferred to Wanda Hatton pursuant to a Decree of Divorce and Judgment (the
"Decree of Divorce") (Appendix 1) between William and Wanda Hatton. Complaint 11 6768. (R. 11).
23.

The June 30, 1988 Complaint (the "1988 Complaint") was commenced by The

Travel Company to collect the same monies that are the subject of the current action.
(R. 77-98).

5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH CORPORATE
CONTINUANCE STATUTE.
This case involves a contractual dispute between Morris Travel Express

Corporation ("Morris") and "The Travel Company," a corporation that has been dissolved
for more than five years. The lawsuit is being prosecuted by one of The Travel Company's
two former shareholders, Plaintiff William Hatton ("Hatton"). The Travel Company's other
former shareholder, Wanda Hatton, former wife of William Hatton, is not a party to this
suit.
The action is founded upon Plaintiff's allegations that Defendants failed to properly
account and pay for amounts due under an Agreement for the Purchase and Sale of Assets
dated April 15, 1985 (the "Purchase Agreement") between Morris on the one hand and The
Travel Company and William Hatton and Wanda Hatton on the other hand. The alleged
breach of contract claims and demand for accounting belong solely to The Travel Company.
Applicable Utah law, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989), permits a corporate action to be
asserted by the corporation or its shareholders within two years of a corporation's
dissolution. The Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved on October 1, 1987. The
present action was filed more than five years after The Travel Company was dissolved and
more than three years after the expiration of the corporate continuance period.
H.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-100 (1989) IS A SURVIVAL
STATUTE, NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Plaintiffs argument that the corporate survival statute is a statute of limitation

or that such statute may be displaced by a longer statute of limitations is erroneous. Utah
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Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) is a survival statute, not a statute of limitations. Unlike a
statute of limitations, survival statutes extend the period to pursue claims otherwise
extinguished by common law. Accordingly, Hatton must demonstrate that he has standing in
1993, more than five years after The Travel Company's dissolution, to pursue this corporate
claim. Unquestionably Hatton cannot do so.
m.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-100 IS NOT SUBJECT TO EQUITABLE
TOLLING
Hatton argues for equitable tolling of the statute. However, survival statutes

are not subject to equitable tolling.1 E.g.. Canadian Ace Brewing v. Anheuser-Busch. Inc..
448 F.Supp 769, 771-72 (N.D.I11. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 444
U.S. 884 (1979); Canadian Ace Brewing v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183,
1189 (7th Cir. 1980); Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank of DeKalb. 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct.
App. 1972).
Even if the Utah survival statute were somehow subject to "equitable tolling" that
concept does not assist Hatton. Hatton has not alleged, nor has there been any fraudulent
concealment, recent discovery of the present cause of action or any other equitable

None of the cases Plaintiff cites support equitable tolling. See Midland Financial
Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue. 328 N.W.2d 866 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982)
(plaintiff "was not commencing an action. . . but was continuing administrative
proceedings [by] instituting judicial review"); Striker v. Chester. 217 A.2d 31 (Del.
1966) (dissolved corporation was realigned as a plaintiff party in an action originally
filed before the corporation was dissolved in which the corporation was named as a
defendant); North American Asbestos v. Superior Court of Alemeda County. 128 Cal.
App.3d 138, 143 (1982) (a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to quash is the
proper vehicle to assert the survival statute); and Moore v. Nick's Fine Foods. Inc..
460 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1984) (the rule permitting minors to bring an action within two
years of reaching the age of majority "overrides" the corporate dissolution statute).
7

consideration which could possibly toll the two year dissolution period. See Brigham Young
University v. Paulsen Const. Co.. 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987) (tolling occurs only in
"exceptional circumstances" where application of a statute of limitations is irrational and
unjust).
Here, Hatton had full knowledge of the dispute with Morris before the wind-up period
even began. Hatton's Decree of Divorce and property settlement in the divorce proceeding
demonstrate that Hatton knew about the present dispute with Morris as early as January 21,
1987 (eight full months before the Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved). Because
Hatton has known about the current dispute and yet failed to fully prosecute such action for
more than six years, he cannot now be heard to rely upon equitable principles.
IV.

PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE PREDISSOLUTION CLAIMS.
Plaintiffs, in an attempt to escape the bar of the corporate continuance statute,

have asserted a new theory on appeal, i.e., that their claims are postdissolution claims rather
than predissolution claims and, therefore, not subject to the two year limitation period.
Plaintiffs want this Court to ignore the allegations in their Complaint and their prior
sworn acknowledgements in the Divorce Documents to the effect that;
1)

The disputed claims arose prior to May, 1986;

2)

By February 9. 1987. Hatton had acknowledged in the Divorce Agreement that
the disputed claim of $241,000 in principal payments would only be realized,
if at all, through litigation;

3)

The Divorce Agreement was entered into to provide for the manner in which
the litigation would be funded and any proceeds distributed;

4)

In the Divorce Assignment, also acknowledged and attested to by Hatton on
February 9. 1987. "Disputed Installments" were defined as those installments
under the Morris Note that were to have been paid beginning on January 31,
8

1990 and continuing through April 30, 1990, in the total approximate principal
amount of $241,000;
5)

In Plaintiffs' First and Second Causes of Action, they set forth that the
principal balance owing under the Promissory Note and the Purchase
Agreement is $240,704.38;

6)

In the Divorce Assignment the "Undisputed Installments" were defined as
principal payments totalling $84,000.

There is simply no question that Hatton knew, no later, than February 9, 1987, that
the disputed principal amount of approximately $241,000 would only be recoverable through
litigation. The Travel Company was not dissolved until nearly 8 months later, on October 1,
1987. The claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint are all predissolution claims.
Even if the claims were deemed postdissolution claims, Plaintiffs' Complaint would
be dismissed. Postdissolution claims are not specifically addressed by statute; therefore,
common law prevails and subsequent to the corporation's death, no claims in favor of the
nonexistent corporation can arise.
V.

HATTON LACKS ANY INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON WHICH
HE CAN SUE THE DEFENDANTS.
Hatton asserts that even if the two year corporate dissolution statute applies,

the statute bars only The Travel Company's claims and not Hatton's individual claims
inasmuch as Hatton is a separate party to the Purchase Agreement. See Brief of Appellant,
at 18. Hatton's argument is disingenuous. Hatton is not a party to the Promissory Note or
entitled to payment under the provisions of the Purchase Agreement.
The Complaint makes it clear that Hatton's purported individual claim is a recent
creation designed to get around the corporate survival statute. See Appendix 5 (Summary of
the Complaint's Substantive Allegations). That creation is defeated not only by the
9

Complaint but also the express terms of the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement.
Hatton is not a party to the Note or the Purchase Agreement provisions upon which recovery
is sought.
Hatton references his divorce settlement agreement for his authority to pursue the
present action against Morris. Hatton's reliance upon the Divorce Settlement Documents and
the Decree of Divorce is remarkable since those documents, when reviewed, directly refute
Hatton's position that he has an individual claim.
If the amounts allegedly owed by Morris were due Bill Hatton individually, then prior
pleadings and representations to this Court in the 1988 Complaint filed by The Travel
Company and the Divorce Settlement Documents were filled with false representations. In
the 1988 Complaint, these identical claims were asserted and it was clearly represented that
The Travel Company, not Bill Hatton, owns the claims. The Divorce Settlement Documents
are filled with representations that the claims belong to The Travel Company and that
William and Wanda Hatton only stand to gain from the claims as shareholders via a
subsequent distribution from The Travel Company. Further, if allowed, Hatton's position
would result in his being able to "individually" collect a corporate obligation without
accounting to creditors who are subject to the bar of § 16-10-100.
VI.

HATTON'S CLAIM AS A SUCCESSOR SHAREHOLDER DOES NOT
AVOID THE SURVIVAL STATUTE.
Recognizing the inevitable, Hatton's final argument is that he may bring this

claim as a successor to the corporation. Morris does not dispute that Hatton could have sued
as a succeeding shareholder within the two year statutory period. However, the statute
unequivocally applies to "the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders . . . ."
10

Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. Hatton is thus barred from bringing suit against Morris.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS5 CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE UTAH
CORPORATE CONTINUANCE STATUTE.
A. Introduction.
Under common law, dissolution of a corporation "puts an end to its existence,

the result may be likened to the death of a natural person." Chicago Title & Trust Co. v.
Forty-One Thirty-Six Wilcox Bldg.. 302 U.S. 120, 125 (1937). Consequently, "after a
corporation is dissolved, it is incapable of maintaining an action; and all such actions pending
at the time of dissolution abate, in the absence of a statute to the contrary." Id; see also
Platz v. Intemat'l Smelting Co.. 213 P. 187, 190 (Utah 1922) ("The effect of a legal
dissolution of a corporation is to do away with and terminate the legal entity. . . . If such be
the legal effect of the dissolution, there was no legal entity at the time of filing. . . ."). That
rule of law applies equally to shareholders or others who seek to assert claims either on
behalf of or as assignees of corporate rights. See MBC. Inc. v. EngeL 397 A.2d 636, 639
(N.H. 1979).
Utah, consistent with many jurisdictions, ameliorated the common law rule by
adopting the provisions of the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA") in 1961. See
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-1 (1991) (Compiler's Notes). The MBCA provides for survival of
corporate remedies as pursued by the corporation, its directors, officers or shareholders for a
period of two years after dissolution. Because the survival statute extends the period to
pursue claims otherwise extinguished by the common law, the terms of the statute must be
strictly met for a claim to be pursued. See MBC. Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 638
11

(N.H. 1979).2 The statute is not subject to equitable exceptions. Koepke v. First Nat'l Bank
of DeKalb. 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct. App. 1972).
B.

The Utah Statute.

The relevant Utah statute provides in part:
The dissolution of a corporation either (1) by the issuance of a
certificate of dissolution by the Division of Corporations and
Commercial Code . . . shall not take away or impair any remedy
available to . . . the corporation, its directors, officers, or shareholders.
for any right or claim existing . . . prior to such dissolution if action or
other proceeding thereon is commenced within two years after the date
of such dissolution.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) (emphasis added).3
The undisputed facts are that The Travel Company and Hatton failed to pursue
their claims within the two year time frame of the applicable Utah statute. The Travel
Company was dissolved on October 1, 1987. (R. 74). Although Hatton and The Travel
Company were obviously aware of the alleged claim and retained counsel to pursue
collection within the two year period (See 1988 Complaint, (R. 77-98), that action was
voluntarily dismissed by The Travel Company subsequent to Morris' tender of what it
believed and asserted to be the remaining balance due on the Promissory Note.
Supplemental Statement of Facts 1f 10. Now, more than five years after The Travel

See also Chicago Title. 302 U.S. at 127-28 ("How long and upon what terms a statecreated corporation may continue to exist is a matter exclusively of state power. The
circumstances under which the power shall be exercised and the extent to which it
shall be carried are matters of state policy, to be decided by the State Legislature.")
(citations omitted).
Although Utah's Business Corporation Act was revised in 1992, section
16-10a-1704 provides that the Act's revisions do not affect "the operation of [a]
statute or any action taken under it before its repeal."
12

Company's dissolution, Hatton is seeking to reassert the same claim.4
However, it is beyond dispute that the statute applies equally to The Travel Company
and Hatton. By its terms, the statute bars "the corporation, its directors, officers, or
shareholders, for any right or claim . . .[not] commenced within two years after the date of
such dissolution." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989). The 1988 Complaint that was filed
within the two year period was voluntarily dismissed. The present action is barred. The
addition of Hatton as a named plaintiff does nothing to remedy the bar. Whether the
decision to voluntarily dismiss the 1988 Complaint was a result of Morris' tender of what it
believed to be the entire remaining amount due under the Promissory Note and the Purchase
Agreement, which tender was accepted (Supplemental Statement of Facts, 1 11) or a result of
bad advice or misunderstandings,5 the time to rethink the voluntary dismissal and the sagacity
thereof is no longer possible if a legal remedy is sought, only if one wants to languish in
seller's remorse, which Hatton seems prone to do, having brought the same action three
times now over a 5 year period.

Hatton filed a similar lawsuit in the Federal District Court of Montana on or about
March 27, 1991. That lawsuit was dismissed based upon the absence of personal
jurisdiction over Defendants. Just as here, Hatton had no standing to file that lawsuit
since the winding up period for The Travel Company had expired a full year and a
half earlier on October 1, 1989.
While for purposes of this proceeding we accept as true Hatton's understanding that
the 1988 Complaint was voluntarily dismissed because of his counsel's conflict of
interest, such an understanding has no bearing on what the law or the procedural or
ethical requirements are. If a party desires to pursue claims and employs counsel to
file a complaint and that party's counsel thereafter announces a conflict of interest and
the need to withdraw from the case, that party can simply have new counsel
substituted in. Nothing in the law requires or even suggests the need to voluntarily
dismiss the case under such circumstances.
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H.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10-100 (1989) IS A SURVIVAL
STATUTE, NOT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.
Plaintiffs argue that their action based upon the Promissory Note and the

Purchase Agreement is timely within the six year contract statute of limitations. In addition,
Plaintiffs claim that the two year statutory period of corporate dissolution is not applicable
because courts prefer a longer statute of limitations when two such statutes apply. Brief of
Appellant, at 10. Plaintiffs misapprehend the nature of the corporate survival statute.
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 (1989) is not a statute of limitations.6 "[Plaintiffs]
incorrectly equate [] the corporate continuance statute with the statute of limitations." MBC.
Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 638 (N.H. 1979). "At common law, a corporation's capacity
to sue and be sued terminated when the corporation was legally dissolved." Poliquin v.
Sapp. 390 N.E. 2d 974 (111. Ct. App. 1979) (citing 16A W. Fletcher, Encyclopedia of
Corporations. § 8142 (1975)). Unlike a statute of limitations, survival statutes extend the
period to pursue claims otherwise extinguished by the common law. "The distinction is that
a statute of limitations affects the time that a stale claim may be brought while a survival
statute gives life for a limited time to a right or claim that would have been destroyed
entirely but for the statute." Davis v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.. 727 F.Supp. 549 (D.

Plaintiffs' cases deal with selecting between two statutes of limitation. None support
the argument that the corporate survival statute is a statute of limitation or that such
statute may be displaced by a longer statute of limitation. See Juab County Dept. of
Public Welfare v. Summers. 426 P.2d 1 (Utah 1967); Taylor Bros. Co. v. Duden.
188 P.2d 995 (Utah 1948); Thiel v. Taurus Drilling. Ltd.. 710 P.2d 33 (Mont. 1985);
Safeco Ins. Co. v. Honeywell. Inc.. 639 P.2d 996, 1001 (Alaska 1981); Richards
Engineering. Inc. v. Spanel. 745 P.2d 1031 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987); Woodward v.
Chirco Constr.. Inc.. 687 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984).
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S.D. 1989) (citing Van Pelt v. Greathouse. 364 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Neb. 1985)).
Hatton must therefore demonstrate both that his action is timely under the six year
statute of limitations and that he has standing in 1993, more than five years after The Travel
Company's dissolution, to pursue this corporate claim. Unquestionably Hatton cannot do so.
m.

HATTON'S "TOLLING" ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT MERIT.

A.

Section 16-10-100 Is Not Subject To Equitable Tolling.

Recognizing that this claim was filed more than three years too late, Hatton argues
for equitable tolling of the survival statute. However, survival statutes are not subject to
equitable tolling. E.g.. Canadian Ace Brewing v. Anheuser Busch. Inc.. 448 F.Supp. 769
(N.D.ILL. 1978), affd, 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 884 (1979);
Canadian Ace Brewing v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 1189 (7th Cir. 1980);
Koepke v. First Nat. Bank. 284 N.E.2d 671, 672 (111. Ct. App. 1972).
In Canadian Ace Brewing v. Anheuser-Busch. Inc.. 448 F.Supp 769 (N.D.I11. 1978),
affd. 601 F.2d 593 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. 444 U.S. 884 (1979), the court dismissed an
action by a dissolved corporation despite a contention that the plaintiff had been unaware of
the defendant's acts as a result of fraudulent concealment. The court refused to apply
fraudulent concealment as commonly applied to statutes of limitations because of the basic
difference between a statute of limitation and a survival statute. IcL at 772. See infra
Section II ("Unlike a statute of limitations, survival statutes extend the period to pursue
claims otherwise extinguished by the common law"); see also Joseph Schlitz Brewing. 629
F.2d at 1189 ("[s]ince the well-recognized purpose of survival statutes . . . is to provide a
specific duration of time for a corporation to wind up its affairs and thus to set a specified
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time when its existence is terminated, . . . extending th[at] period, by application of the
doctrine of equitable estoppel, would defeat the statute's purpose"); Koepke. 284 N.E.2d at
671 (survival statute bars "an action brought in equity").
None of the cases cited by Plaintiffs support equitable tolling. Plaintiffs place great
reliance on Striker v. Chesler. 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 1966). However, Striker and another case
cited by Plaintiffs stand for the unremarkable proposition that if the action is commenced
within the wind-up period, that action may be prosecuted to completion after the statutory
period.7 The Utah statute expressly recognizes as much. Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100.
Plaintiffs also quote extensively from John J. Gamalski Hardware v. Baird. 299 N.W.
757 (Mich. 1941) as quoted in Striker. Brief of Appellant at 14. However, the Michigan
Supreme Court itself limited the 1941 Gamalski case to its unique replevin facts and held that
a modern survival statute applies to bar a claim for recovery of money due under a contract.
Dawn Construction Co. v. Paris Home Builders. Inc.. 103 N.W.2d 410 (Mich. 1960). The
remaining two cases cited by Hatton are not remotely connected to these facts and do not
support the notion that equitable tolling is appropriate.8

7

See Midland Financial Corp. v. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue. 328 N.W.2d 866 (Wis,
Ct. App. 1982) (where the plaintiff "was not commencing action. . . but was
continuing administrative proceedings [by] instituting judicial review"); Striker v.
Chesler. 217 A.2d 31 (Del. 1966) (where a dissolved corporation was realigned from
a defendant to a plaintiff in an action originally filed before the corporation was
dissolved).

8

In North American Asbestos v. Superior Court. 128 Cal. App.3d 138, 143 (1982),
the court simply held that a motion to dismiss rather than a motion to quash is the
proper vehicle to assert the survival statute. In Moore v. Nick's Finer Foods. Inc..
460 N.E.2d 420, 421 (1984), the court determined that the rule permitting minors to
Footnote continued on next page.
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B.

Hatton Can Recite No Facts To Support
"Equitable Tolling".

Even if the Utah survival statute were somehow subject to "equitable tolling," that
concept does not assist Hatton. Hatton has not alleged, nor has there been any fraudulent
concealment, recent discovery of the present cause of action or any other equitable
consideration that could possibly toll the two year dissolution period.
In Brigham Young University v. Paulsen Const. Co.. 744 P.2d 1370 (Utah 1987), the
Utah Supreme Court discussed equitable tolling in the context of a contract statute of
limitations. The court held that tolling occurs only in "exceptional circumstances" where the
application of a statute of limitations is irrational or unjust. IcL at 1374. In Paulsen, the
plaintiff discovered a breach of contract approximately midway through the running of the
statutory period. Because there was an opportunity to timely file, equitable tolling would not
apply even to the period prior to discovery. Id.
Here, Hatton had full knowledge of the dispute with Morris before the wind-up period
even began. Hatton's Decree of Divorce and Divorce Settlement Documents demonstrate
that Hatton knew about the present dispute with Morris prior to February 9, 1987 (nearly
eight months before the Travel Company was involuntarily dissolved). Consequently, prior
to January, 1988, The Travel Company retained counsel to collect these same monies
allegedly owed under the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. See 1988 Complaint
(R. 77-98).

Footnote continued from previous page.
bring an action within two years of reaching the age of majority "overrides" the
corporate dissolution statute.
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On or about February 1988, Morris tendered $92,933.03 as a final payment under the
Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. IcL 1

. Morris made it clear that no

additional amounts were due and that no additional amounts would be paid. IcL 1

.

As a result of Morris' position, The Travel Company filed a lawsuit (the "1988
Complaint") on about June 30, 1988 in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah, asserting these same claims. (R. 77-98). On or about August 3, 1988,
however, The Travel Company voluntarily dismissed its lawsuit. Thereafter, no action was
initiated by either Hatton or The Travel Company within the two year corporate dissolution
period.9
Because Hatton has known about the current dispute and yet failed to fully prosecute
such action for more than six years, he cannot now be heard to rely upon equitable
principles.
C.

Hatton. Bv His Own Act Or Failure To Act
Allowed The Dissolution Of The Travel Company

Plaintiffs' final argument in equity is to the effect that this Court is being asked to
give its blessing to a potential abuse of Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100 where one company
purchases another corporation, providing for a balloon payment for the purchase price three
years down the road and then voluntarily dissolving the purchased corporation, avoiding any
repayment. Brief of Appellant, at 16. Plaintiffs further suggest that in the case at hand, in
Hatton makes reference to his having improperly filed a 1991 lawsuit in Montana as
an "equitable" factor. Aside from the fact that the Montana lawsuit was ill conceived
and Hatton voluntarily dismissed his appeal in that case under a threat of dismissal by
the Ninth Circuit, the fact remains that the Montana action was filed approximately a
year and one-half after expiration of the wind-up period.
18

spite of providing for payments through April 30, 1990, Morris purchased the name and all
other assets of The Travel Company, thereby subsuming The Travel Company. Plaintiffs
then conclude that this was the reason The Travel Company was dissolved, having no reason
for a continuing existence. Brief of Appellant, at 15. These assumptions and conclusions
are, of course, erroneous, legally incorrect and not supported by the record.
First, Morris did not cause or require The Travel Company to dissolve. The
dissolution was the result of the Plaintiffs' "failure to file an annual report." (R.

).

Whether the result of a conscious decision or neglect, the dissolution occurred because of
Plaintiffs' failure to act, not because of any actions of Morris.
Second, the fact that a corporation sells its name and assets does not require a
dissolution. It is a simple matter to amend articles of incorporation and change a corporate
name. It is also a simple matter to continue a corporate existence by submitting an annual
filing, even if you do not want to acquire new assets and continue to operate.
Third, the record is clear that at the time of the Purchase Agreement, it was Hatton's
intent to continue the corporation's existence. Whether this intent was motivated by tax
considerations or future business considerations or otherwise does not matter. That the
election to sell the assets rather than the stock of the company was Hatton's is clear from the
Complaint. Paragraph 9 states that in or about December, 1984, Morris offered to purchase
the stock or the assets of The Travel Company from the Hattons. Paragraph 10 then states
that William Hatton negotiated with Morris the terms of sale of the assets of The Travel
Company. (R. 3). Had Hatton decided to sell his stock instead, Utah Code Ann.
§ 16-10-100 would not come into play. The purchase price would be due the selling

19

shareholder. Hatton, for whatever reason, negotiated the sale of the assets of The Travel
Company, electing to have The Travel Company be the payee on the Promissory Note and
the beneficiary under the Purchase Agreement.
The intent of Hatton to keep the corporation alive is further evidenced by the
following undisputed facts:
(1)

The sale of assets was consummated on April 15, 1985 (R. 23) and the

dissolution did not occur until October 1, 1987 (R. 75);
(2)

The Divorce Assignment (Appendix 4) contemplated the filing of State and

Federal tax returns "for fiscal years ending June 30, 1986 and June 30, 1987" and
payment of those tax obligations. Divorce Assignment, 1 5.
(3)

Morris was ordered in the Decree of Divorce (Appendix 1) to tender all future

amounts owed under the Morris Note and the Morris Agreement to The Travel
Company, in care of Wanda Hatton's attorneys, Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown.
Decree of Divorce, 1 10.
(4)

Under the terms of the Purchase Agreement, The Travel Company retained its

accounts receivable. Supplemental Statement of Facts, 1 12.
(5)

The Travel Company had ongoing responsibilities and commitments under the

terms of the Purchase Agreement. See, e.g. 1 16 Survival of Representations and
Warranties and 1 17 Further Assurances. Supplemental Statement of Facts, 1 13.
(6)

The Divorce Settlement Documents, under date of February, 1987 are filled

with representations that the claims belong to The Travel Company. Appendixes 1
3 and 4.
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Fourth, this matter does not concern a note or balloon payment payable in the future.
Whether appropriately labeled as anticipatory breach or an accord and satisfaction, the case
u t j i a t was

c|ear|y

defined ^ d known by the parties no

later than April 9, 1987. See Divorce Agreement and Divorce Assignment. See also Section

PIAINTIFFS' CLAIMS ARE PREDISSOLUTION CLAIMS.
Plaintiffs in their

i

argument that their claims are postdissolution claims rather than predissolution claims and
are, therefore, not subject to the two year corporate survival statute. Brief of Appellant at
In the absence of finding supportive case law on point, Plaintiffs attempt to come in
through the back door by using this Court's holding in Hansen v. Dept. of Financial
Institutions, 858 p 2 :! Il 84 ( ( ] \z I: i \ p p I 993) (Plaintiffs* c h in; i is v ei e predissolution claims
and therefore subject to Utah Code Ann. §16-10-100). Brief of Appellant at 16.
mi v Si ill Ik'I I IK ill

it

Plaintiffs' claims are predissolution claims. The Travel Company was dissolved by the State
of I Jtah on October 1, 198/

Plaintiffs, in their Complaint, state the following:

"In or about May, 1986, Morris requested The Travel Company to
agree to an adjustment in the promissory note." Complaint, t 33
(emphasis added). (R. 6).
Based on its own accounting, Morris claimed that it was entitled to a
reduction in the promissory note of more than $200.000." Id., f 34.
(R. 6) (emphasis added).
Morris requested The Travel Company and the Hattons to sign
amendment to the promissory note reflecting Morris' claimed
reduction. The claimed adjustment was not and has not been accepted
by The Travel Company or its shareholders, the Hattons." Id., 1 35
21

(R. 6).
Among the representations in the Divorce Agreement (Appendix 3), attested to by
Hatton on February 9. 1987 we find the following:
(1)

"It may be necessary or advisable to litigate certain provisions of the
Morris Note and the Morris Agreement (the 'Morris Litigation')."
Divorce Agreement, t E.

(2)

"Travel Company Funds may not be used in the prosecution of the
Morris Litigation absent join approval by Wanda and Bill." Id., H 2.

(3)

"If either Bill or Wanda declines to approve the use of Travel Company
Funds or to advance Joint Funds for the Morris Litigation, the other
may proceed with the Morris Litigation in the name of the Travel
Company, using Individual Funds." Id., 1 4 (emphasis added).

(4)

"Bill and Wanda agree that either of them may retain an attorney to
prosecute the Morris Litigation on a contingent fee basis . . . ."
Id., 1 5 .

(5)

"Both parties must approve any settlement of the Morris Litigation
before such settlement is binding." Id., 1 6.

The entire Divorce Agreement is built around the litigation that must take place if the
Travel Company is to ever realize the more than $200,000 reduction Morris had been
claiming since May, 1986.
Among the representations in the Divorce Assignment (Appendix 4), attested to by
Hatton on February 9. 1987. we find the following:
(1)

"The Term 'Disputed Installments' shall mean and refer to those
installments due under the Morris Note which Morris disputes, said
installments falling due beginning on January 31, 1988, and continuing
through April 30, 1990, in the total approximate principal amount of
$241.000." Divorce Assignment, 1 1(c) (emphasis added).

(2)

"In the event litigation is commenced to recover the Disputed
Installments from Morris, and such litigation is successful, the proceeds
of such litigation shall be distributed first to litigation expenses."
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Divorce Assignment, 1 3 (emphasis added).
It is somewhat beyond coincidence that in Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action they set
[iromissory note is $240,704.38", and that
in their Second Cause of Action they set forth that "[t] he principal balance owing under the
ase Agitriiiint i V I I I 'III "'

i r npl iint Hi '! *

h hi" I I

I I

(HinrttHb, the

disputed amount, which Morris had determined it was not paying, had been fixed and
communicated long before the undisputed $84,295 62 principal payment was made in January
or February, 1988. See Supplemental Statements of Facts, 11 10 & 11. See also Divorce
Assignment, 1 1(b), for Hatton's definition of "Undisputed Installments," which, again
beyond coincidence, he indicates consist of principal payments totalling $84,000. The
disputed principal amount of $241,000 had been fixed and communicated no later than
Febri la r ;; 9. 1 98 7, i lea i b 8 it i i
Plaintiffs' claims are predissolution claims subject to the provisions of the corporate survival
statute.
Plaintiffs are not helped even if the claims were deemed to have arisen
postdissolution. As stated in i Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations.
§ 8141 at 433-34 (1988):
Statutes that continue the corporation's existence for a period after
dissolution for the prosecution of claims usually refer to claims existing
at the time of dissolution. This does not mean that the statutory period
—usually three years- does not apply as a limitation to claims that arise
after dissolution; that is, that such claims may be brought even after the
statutory period has expired. Rather, in the absence of coverage under
the language of the statute, such claims revert to control by the
common law, under which the corporation became extinct for all
purposes upon dissolution. Therefore, a claim that arises after
dissolution cannot be brought at all, much less brought in excess of the
23

statutory continuation period.
V.

HATTON LACKS ANY INDEPENDENT BASIS UPON WHICH
HE CAN SUE THE DEFENDANTS.

A.

The Complaint Makes It Clear That Hatton
Has No Individual Claim.

Hatton asserts that even if the two year corporate dissolution statute applies, the
statute bars only The Travel Company's claims and not Hatton's individual claims inasmuch
as Hatton is a separate party to the Purchase Agreement between The Travel Company and
Morris. See Brief of Appellant, at 18. Hatton's argument is disingenuous. Hatton is not a
party to the Promissory Note or entitled to payment under the provisions of the Purchase
Agreement. The fact that Morris' alleged obligations are owed only to The Travel Company
is made crystal clear in the Complaint itself. Attached hereto as Appendix 5 is a summary of
each substantive allegation made in Plaintiffs Complaint. Those allegations are consistent
and unambiguous: the Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement provisions sought to be
enforced are exclusively obligations allegedly owed to The Travel Company, not Hatton.
After reading the Complaint, the only conclusion is that Hatton's purported individual claim
is a recent creation designed to get around the corporate survival statute.
That creation, however, is defeated by the Complaint and the express terms of the
Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement. Hatton is not a party to the Promissory Note.
Although Hatton is a party to the Purchase Agreement, he is a party only for the purpose of
entering into a non-compete provision and providing representations and warranties regarding
The Travel Company. See Complaint, 11 7 and 9. R. 3). Hatton is not a party to
paragraph 1 of the Purchase Agreement which deals with the purchase of The Travel
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Company's assets. Hatton is also not a party to paragraph 2, which sets forth the purchase
price and payment terms of the Purchase Agreement. Paragraph 2 allocates $50,000 to
.M
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nor a party to paragraphs 1 & 2 of the Purchase Agreement he cannot individually bring an
action on

romissory Note or Purchase Agreement.

Because he is not a party to the Promissory Note, Hatton asserts that he is a third
party creditor beneficiary of the Promissory Note. Hatton's argument is not well founded in
lav see Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1979)
("even though a shareholder owns all, or practically all, of the stock in a corporation, such a

corporation."). See also Hansen v. Green River Group. 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct.

the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit must be clear.") Nothing in
the Note or Agreement demonstrate an intent to confer a separate benefit upon Hatton,
monies payable under the Note are payable to The Travel Company, not Hatton.10

10

Hatton, realizing that in his shareholder capacity he has no claim as a third party
beneficiary, argues that Morris, by its counsel's January 5, 1988 letter (R. 141-142),
was somehow acknowledging that William Hatton and Wanda Hatton, other than in
their capacity as shareholders, had individual claims to amounts due under the
Purchase Agreement and Promissory Note. Besides not being helpful to Hatton since
the language of the agreements itself must clearly set forth an intention to confer a
separate and distinct benefit on a third party, the attempt to so cast the meaning of the
Footnote continued on next page.
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In one last desperate attempt to revive his claims for a third "go-around," Hatton tries
to piggy-back onto The Travel Company's claims under paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Purchase
Agreement arguing that individual rights are granted to him with respect to all provisions of
the Purchase Agreement by the boilerplate language of paragraph 19(b) (Brief of Appellant,
at 19) which provides:
(1)

All of the terms of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the
benefit of, and shall be enforceable by the heirs, executors, administrators,
successors, legal representatives and assigns of Buyer, Seller and the Hattons.

Approaching this language with Plaintiffs' logic would lead to the absurdity that
Morris, by virtue of this paragraph, also has rights under all provisions of the Purchase
Agreement meaning it would be both obligor and obligee under paragraphs 1 & 2.
Paragraph 19(b) does no such thing. Its meaning is clear and well established. The rights of
Hatton to the claims of The Travel Company devolve only because of his shareholder status
which gives him no greater rights than the corporation under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100.
B.

The Divorce Documents Further Support The
Absence Of An Individual Claim.

Footnote continued from previous page.
letter is misrepresentative. For ease of review, the January 5, 1988 letter is included
with this Brief as Appendix 2. In the first sentence of the second paragraph counsel
for Morris states: "As you are aware, the payee under the Note is not William
Hatton. but The Travel Company. Inc." Counsel for Morris then mentions how
Morris was ordered, pursuant to William Hatton's and Wanda Hatton's Decree of
Divorce to make payments under the note to Fox, Edwards, Gardiner & Brown which
firm, since the Decree, had been dissolved leaving it unclear to whom payment was
now to be made. Not wanting to get caught in the crossfire of the divorce, counsel
for Morris insisted that it receive joint instruction from Bill and Wanda Hatton, rather
than complying with the demand of Jan Graham, who represented only William
Hatton. No reading of the letter suggests that Morris "confirms" the legal conclusion
that William and Wanda Hatton are creditor beneficiaries.
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Hatton provides one paragraph of the Divorce Settlement Documents (R. 136) „. i
convoluted attempt to show that he has ai 1 individual claii i i

I latton 's reliance upon the

Divorce Settlement Documents and the Decree of Divorce is remarkable since those
documents directly refute Hatton's position that he has an individual claim. Consistent with
lim iIIIIIirIMIiiin 1 ill lln ('nmpLiinl llim Mnnni Ai'nvmnil

i null portinn nil «"i Iiiin li I hlliim

attached to his Memorandum in Opposition to Dismiss (R. 136), confirms the following
" f a i l " . , "i villi in, ni i III lint 1 m i l i l l ! mi1 in,'! ill.ill 11 ., h i ! . i n 1 s l i | i u L i U ill ih"" I! ' lii'ini",

""""!I:

Bill and Wanda each own 50 percent of all of the authorized stock of a
corporation known as the Travel Company.
The Travel Company is the holder of a note receivable from Morris
Travel Corporation (the "Morris Note") and the beneficiary of certain
E

It may be necessary or advisable to litigate certain provisions of the
Morris Note and the Morris Agreement (the "Morris Litigation"),
provisions in an agreement for the purchase and sale of assets betwe*
and the Travel Company (the "Morris Agreement").

Divorce Agreement, f'f C Eh

Appends

-,K. _,W»

.. Divorce

Settlement Documents go on to state that the Promissory Note is executed by "Morris Travel
Corporation in favor of The Travel Company" and reference is made to "payments to which
iiic *.c*vi» ^oiiijj^
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The Travel Company , . ." IcL at 11(c) and 11(d) (emphasis added). Absolutely no
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Further, the Divorce Settlement Documents require that proceeds obtained from
Morm .i, i be paid to extinguish corporate tax obligations of The Travel Company, Divorce
Assignment at 11 2 and J.

ppendix 4. (R. 216-217). Finally, because The Travel
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Company's shareholders disagreed over the merits of the claim,11 Travel Company funds
could not be used to pursue the corporate claim except upon express agreement of the
shareholders. Divorce Agreement at 1 2. The above representations resulted in a Decree of
Divorce to "tender all future amounts owed under the Morris Note and Morris Agreement to
The Travel Company, in care of [Wanda's] attorneys." Decree of Divorce, 1 10. (R. 243).
The Divorce documents unequivocally refute rather than support Hatton's argument
that he has an individual claim.
C.

The 1988 Complaint further confirms the derivative
nature of Hatton's claims.

In its 1988 Complaint, The Travel Company asserts these exact claims.12 At that
time, it was specifically represented that The Travel Company, not Hatton, owned the
claims: "Hatton, as the President of The Travel Company, and with the consent and
approval of Wanda J. Hatton, brings this action in the name of The Travel Company." 1988
Complaint at 1 67. (R. 86). Hatton's sudden right to sue "individually" is an artificial
attempt to complete an end run around the corporate dissolution statute.13 Hatton's individual
claims, at best, are based upon his shareholder status, thus making the

11

Wanda considered recovery against Morris to be "speculative at best." Wanda J.
Hatton's Trial Memorandum, at 11 7 and 11. (R. 222-224). Wanda also candidly
acknowledged the obvious: "[the] Note . . . was issued in favor of the couple's
business, The Travel Company." IcL at 13.

12

The complaints are almost identical, with only a few edits in the present Complaint to
the background facts. See Complaint 11 18, 20, 37, 41, 44, 45 and 67. (R. 4, 6, 7,
8, 11). The claims themselves are identical. See First through Ninth Causes of
Action of the Complaint (R. 10-19) and the 1988 Complaint. (R. 86-95).

13

As discussed above, the substantive allegations in the two complaints are identical
Footnote continued on next page.
28

claims derivative in nature and subject to Uuiii Coue nun. § lo-iO-iGU
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In addition, the implication of Hatton's sudden shift is very troubling for The Travel
r
against the corporation." Utah Code Ann. , k» ••• iOO(i^su). Thus, if allowed, Hatton's
lHIS

HI

in

PI

mi i i in in mi I mi! i i

i mi ill

ni

HI

In ni 1 I i»i» I n i i

. 11.1 I

c o r p 0 r a t e 0 5iig a ti on

without

accounting to the corporation's creditors as a result of the bar now in place under
§ 16 10 100 I ""i lew: to dissolution, those creditors would have had priority over the
shareholders as specifically acknowledged in the Hattons' divorce settlement. See Divorce
Assignment, 1 2 (requiring payment of corporate taxes before distributing Morris'

individual claim theory.14
IATTON'S CLAIM AS A SUCCESSOR SHAREHOLDER TO THE
TRAVEL COMPANY DOES NOT AVOID THE SURVIVAL STATUTE.

Recognizing the inevitable, Hatton's final argument is that he may bring this claim as
a

rris

could have SUM I .i" i

succeeding shareholder within the two year statutory period. However, the statute
unequivocally applies to IIle corporation, its a;,., . .

officers, or shareholders.

"

Footnote continued from previous page.
with The Travel Company being consistently listed as the only party to whom
obligations are owed. See Complaint. (R. 2-22), and 1988 Complaint (R. 77-98).
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See e.g. Brangan v. United States. 373 F.Supp 1050, 1052 (E.D. Va. 1973) (party
may not be discharged from liabilities and then pursue recovery of a claim not
available to creditors); Snyder v. Routzahn. 55 F.2d 396, 396-97 (N.D. Ohio 1931)
(same); Moore v. Slonim. 426 F. Supp. 524, 527 (D.Conn. 1977) (Same); In re
Medley. 29 B.R. 84, 86 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (same).
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Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100. Cases decided under the MBCA uniformly apply the statute
to a corporation's shareholders. See MBC. inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 639 (N.J. 1979);
Poliquin v. Sapp. 72 111. App.3d 477, 390 N.E.2d 974, 978 (1979); Koepke v. First Nat.
Bank. 5 111. App.3d 799, 284 N.E.2d 671 (1972); Huston v. Fulgam Industries. 869 F.2d
1457, 1461 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying Oklahoma law); Canadian Ace Brewing v. Joseph
Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 1187 (2nd Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois law);
Godeon v. Loew's Inc.. 147 F. Supp. 398, 408 (D. N.J. 1956), aff d on other grounds. 247
F2d 451 (1974), disapproved on other grounds. New Jersey v. Morton Salt. 387 F.2d 94
(3rd Cir. 1969).15
The Engel Court declared emphatically:
"We will not permit the corporation continuance statute to be circumvented by
allowing former shareholders to assert expired rights of a defunct corporation
after the statutory period has elapsed. The expired right is no more
enforceable in the former shareholders' possession than it is in the defunct
corporation's.... The former shareholder has no greater rights than the
defunct corporation." MBC. Inc. v. Engel. supra. 397 p.2d 636, 639.

The only circumstance where a shareholder may pursue an action after the statutory
period is where the "claim has been reduced to a judgment prior to expiration of the
statutory period. At that point, a "claim" no longer exists and the judgment, like
other tangible property, passes to the shareholders as a fixed debt. Canadian Ace
Brewing v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co.. 629 F.2d 1183, 1187 (7th Cir. 1980). The
judgment represents a property interest and, therefore, an action to collect the
judgment does not violate the policy of the statute to avoid a "continuous dribble of
business activity contrary to the intent of the winding up provisions of the statute."
MBC. Inc. v. Engel. 397 A.2d 636, 639 (N.H. 1979) (citation omitted). Thus, Levy
v. Liebling. 238 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1956) is inapposite since that case concerns a
judgment.
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CONCLUSION
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I I I 111 in mi 11 I ni n
i I i 11 ni I il ni I I I ni 11 mi ni I I 11 i mi 11 ni ni i ni ni i ni 11 i I ni i ' t * l ' f e < t 111 III ini i i i 11 M n *.i (i"

Survival Statute on his claims. But no matter how hard he attempts to twist and turn or to
pert on 111 v'lul iiiiiiM, Ilk1 Lis Is JM ' i/'l loilli in 111: • i"' tmpLmil, in llie I tihluse Agreement, in llie

Promissory Note, and in the Divorce Settlement Documents continue to haunt him. There is
no way around the fact that his claims are derivative, at best. The Promissory Note is
payable only to The Travel Company. The provisions of the Purchase Agreement dealing
with the payments in dispute require payment to The Travel Company. Ihe Travel Company
t i m e l y b r o u g h t 111 i i tjirrif u n l inii I 1 ' P I m l

h i i i l i i n h i l i s m i s s n l nil

Il in I II in mi ilillli

Illi i i i i il \\\

dismissal was a result of bad advice, a lack of advise, an evidence of an accord and

to this case. What does matter is that if Hatton wanted to pursue the claims, he needed to
Complaint prior to October I 1989 I laving failed to do so, those claims can no
longer be pursued. The decision of the District Court should be affirmed.

t£

DATED this ^/T

.'.= of March, 1994.

, x;

^Wx/C,
This R. James
Attorney for Defendants/Appellees
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Appellee's Brief was served
on the following individual by placing the same in the United States mail, postage pre-paid, this
••^i*

day of March 1994.

GORDON K. JENSEN
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE
Attorneys for Appellants
136 South Main Street, Suite 721
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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WILLIAM A, HATTON and MORRIS
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(a)

Lot

and

residence

located

at

4391

Adonis

Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah (the "Adonis Property");
(b)

A

three-bedroom

townhouse

located

in

West

Yellowstone, Montana, which is currently being rented to
the local pharmacist for $400 per month, and upon which
the monthly debt service obligation is $429 ("Townhouse
#7").
3.

Plaintiff

encumbrances
commence

on

making

is
the

ordered
Adonis

monthly

to

assume

Property.

debt

the

mortgage

Plaintiff

service

payments

shall
on

the

townhouse awarded to her in March, 1987, providing rent for
that month is forwarded to plaintiff prior to the due date of
payment.

Defendant

Hatton

shall

make

all

debt

service

payments on Townhouse #7 falling due before March 1, 1987.
Defendant William A. Hatton
arrangements
townhouse

to

have

transferred

appropriate

and

all

is ordered
future

to make appropriate

rent

payments

to plaintiff, and

necessary

documents

shall
to

for

execute

accomplish

said
all
the

transfer.
4.

Defendant William A. Hatton is awarded the following

real property:
(a)
Lake

The real property and residence known as the

Hebgen

Property,

state of Montana;

located

on

Lake

Hebgen

in the
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savings, deposit and other banking accounts in his name or in
the name of Silvercreek Property Management Corporation, all
automobiles in his possession, 50% of all authorized Travel
4

Company stock, 100% of the Silver Creek

stock, and certain

5

proceeds of the Morris Note and Morris Agreement as set forth
6

hereinafter.
7

8.

There are certain proceeds of the Morris Note which

8

are currently on deposit with

the Court.

installment

interest

There is also an

9

of

$50,000

plus

due

from

Morris

on

10

January 31, 1987.

The proceeds on deposit with the court and

11

the

payment

which

is

due

on

January

31, 1987, plus

all

12

interest accrued on both of said payments shall be divided
1.1

and paid as follows:
14

(a)

First,

the

joint

obligation

to

First

15

Interstate

Bank

in

the

approximate

amount

of

$30,000

16

shall be paid in full, including all interest accrued;
17

(b)

The next $40,000 shall be paid to plaintiff,

18

to be used in whatever manner and for whatever purpose
19

she deems appropriate;
JO

(c)

The remaining balance shall be split one-half

M

to plaintiff and one-half to defendant Hatton, each to
>2

utilize said funds in whatever manner and for whatever
>;*

purpose they deem appropriate.
M

9.

The clerk of the court is ordered to tender a check

>5

representing all of the funds presently on deposit with the
>6
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corporate
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:onsummate any transact i w

espect

r^-iau .JAL'S w.tu, ,i«c parties shall

mutually agree upon a reputable
one of

the

mutually

M

Big

tax accountant

Eight" accounting

agreeable

to

them,

to

firms, or
handle

employed by

a

tax

lawyer

calculation

of

corporate taxes due, negotiations with the Internal Revenue
Service, and any

potential liquidation or restructuring of

The Travel Company, the Morris Agreement or the Morris Note
which may be to the mutual advantage of the parties.
12.

All

remaining

Morris Note and
all corporate

amounts

owed

the Morris Agreement

by

Morris

after

tax liability, accounting

under

the

satisfaction of

and attorneys

fees

incurred in connection with the determination and resolution
of the corporate tax liability, shall be split evenly between
the parties, one-half to plaintiff and one-half to defendant.
13.

Any

shortfall

in

funds

to

pay

Travel

Company

corporate tax liabilities after application of the proceeds
of

the Morris

Note

and Morris

Agreement

and

the

earnings

thereon shall be borne one-half by each party.
14.
Travel

Neither party may

Company

or

encumber

incur debt
assets

of

in the name of
the

Travel

the

Company

without the prior written consent of the other.
15.

Plaintiff is awarded all outstanding Travel Company

receivables other

than the Morris Note, and

is entitled

to

receive, collect and expend for her own use and benefit all
such receivables, all at her own expense.

16.

Each party is ordered to bear his or her respective

attorneys' fees and costs.
17.

Neither party is awarded alimony.

18.

Each party is ordered to determine and pay his or

her respective personal tax obligations.
19.

All parties are ordered to execute such documents

as are necessary to consummate the orders set forth in this
judgment and decree of divorce.
20.

The decree of divorce entered herein shall be final

upon entry.
21.

The

orders

entered

in

this

case

are

without

prejudice to the rights and claims, if any, by and between
the Travel Company and its successors in interest, including,
but

not

limited

to, plaintiff

and

defendant

Hatton, and

Morris Travel Corporation and its successors in interest, as
such rights and claims involve the collection or enforcement
of the Morris Note and Morris Agreement.
DATED this /£>

day of February, 1987.
BY THE COURT: /?

Jara£s S < Sawaya
^
Third District Judge
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HOLME R O B E R T S & O W E N
A T T O R N E Y S AT LAW
SUITE <80C
1700 BAOAOWAV
OENVER.COLORADO 6 0 2 9 0

SUITE 9 0 0
5 0 SOUTH MAIN STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 4 1 4 4

SUITE 4 0 0
102 NORTH CASCADE AVENUE
COLORAOO SPRINGS, COLORAOO 0 0 9 0 3

DENVER TECHNOLOGICAL CENTER
SUITE 9 0 0
8*O0 EAST PRENTICE AVENUE
ENGlEWOOO, COLORAOO 80MI

TELEPHONE (801) 5 * 1 - 5 8 0 0

SUITE 4 0 0
1401 PEARL STREET
BOULDER, COLORAOO 8 0 3 0 2

T H O M A S C KELLY

January 5, 1988

HAND DELIVERED
Jan C. Graham
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dear Ms. Graham:
Mark Slack of Morris/Ask Mr. Foster referred to me
your letter of December 17, 1987. You indicate in that letter
.that you have been retained by William A. Hatton in connection
with the dispute over the obligations of Morris Travel
Corporation (HMorristf) under the terms of that certain
promissory note dated April 30, 1985 (the "Note").
As you are aware, the payee under the Note is not
William Hatton but The Travel Company, Inc. William and Wanda
Hatton recently were involved in divorce proceedings. Morris
became entangled in these proceedings against its wishes and
at considerable inconvenience and expense. The divorce decree
that was eventually entered specifically required Morris to
make payments under the note to Fox, Edwards, Gardiner and
Brown, counsel for Wanda Hatton.
Since the dissolution of Fox, Edwards, Gardiner and
Brown, Morris has been in the difficult position of not
knowing to whom payment should be tendered. Morris has taken
the position that it will only tender payments upon joint
instruction of Bill and Wanda Hatton, and has made efforts for
months to receive such joint instructions. Your letter
indicates that you have been retained by Bill Hatton but does
not refer to Wanda Hatton.

€*WU

Jan C. Graham
January 5, 1988
Page 2
Morris intends to promptly pay the entire remaining
balance that it believes is payable under the Note, On behalf
of Morris, I hereby request joint instruction from Bill and
Wanda Hatton (or from counsel representing both of them) as to
how payment under the Note should be made.
In your letter, you also request documentation
relating to the revenues attributable to
__ The Travel
„ Company
for all quarters through the end of the last quarte r. Mark
Slack has indicated that he should be able to provide
provi
you that
information within the next week or so
Morris welcomes the opportunity to attempt to resolve
the dispute regarding amounts due under the Note as amicably
as possible. After the quarterly information has been
provided to you, and after you have had the opportunity to
review other documentation, we would welcome the opportunity
to meet with you to discuss Morris' position regarding this
matter.
If you have any questions, please feel free to call
Rich
Haddock of our office.
me or
Very truly yours,

Thomas E. Kelly
kr
cc:

Mark Slack

APPENDIX NO. 3
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AGREEMENT
This Agreement is entered into by and between Wanda J- Hatton
day of
("Wanda") and William A. Hatton ("Bill") this
February, 1987.
This Agreement is based upon the following facts, which are
not mere recitals, but which are stipulated to be true and which
form an integral part of this Agreement:
A.

Bill and Wanda are husband and wife-

B. Bill and Wanda have agreed to the terms of a Decree of
Divorce (the "Decree") and Assignment (the "Assignment") which,
when fully executed, will sever their marriage and equitably
distribute the real and personal property of the marriage*
C. Bill and Wanda each own 50 percent of all of the
authorized stock of a corporation known as the Travel Company,
D* The Travel Company is the holder of a note receivable
from Morris Travel Corporation (the "Morris Note") and the
beneficiary of certain provisions in an agreement for the purchase
and sale of assets between Morris and the Travel Company (the
"Morris Agreement").
E. It may be necessary or adv i sables Jta..JLLtLga±e --.cental a
provisions of the Morris Note and the Morris Agreement (the
"Morris Litigation"),
F. It is the desire of Bill and Wanda to set forth their
agreement as to the manner in which the Morris Litigation should
be conducted and funded.
NOW THEREFORE in consideration of the parties' mutual
agreement
to the terms of the decree of divorce and the
assignment, Bill and Wanda agree as follows:
1. Dgfinitions* The following definitions shall govern the
terms of this agreement:
(a) The term "Travel Company Funds" shall mean and
refer to funds which were originally owed to the Travel
Company under the Morris Note or the Morris Agreement, which
have not been actually distributed
to Bill or Wanda,
respectively.
(b) The term "Individual Funds" shall mean and refer to
any funds held individually by Bill or Wanda, respectively,
from sources other than Travel Company Funds, or funds which
were formerly Travel Company Funds, but which have become
Individual Funds by reason of distribution to Bill or Wanda,
respectively.
DEp~s,T,0N
C \
\
EXHjBlT

(c) The term "Joint Funds" shall mean and refer to
Individual Funds belonging to Bill and Wanda which they have
contributed to the prosecution of the Morris Litigation,
irrespective of the percentage attributable to each party.
(d) The term "Contingent Fee" shall mean and refer to a
contractual agreement with an attorney for the prosecution of
the Morris
Litigation
wherein
the
attorney's
fee is
contingent upon the successful outcome of the litigation, and
is limited to a percentage of the proceeds of successful
litigation.
2. Conduct of Litigation with Travel Company Funds. Travel
Company Funds may not be used in the prosecution of the Morris
Litigation absent joint approval by Wanda and Bill.
This
prohibition shall extend to the amount of the expenditure as well
as the fact of the expenditure. If Travel Company Funds are used
to fund the Morris Litigation, the proceeds, if any, of th^fc
litigation, shall be distributed according to the terms of tHe
Decree and the Assignment.
3. Conduct of Litigation with Joint Funds. Joint Funds may
not be used in the prosecution of the Morris Litigation absent
joint approval by Wanda and Bill.
This prohibition shall extend
to the amount of the expenditure as well as the fact of the
expenditure.
In the event the Morris Litigation is successful,
and has been funded with Joint Funds, each party shall be entitled
to a return of the amounts advanced prior to any distribution.
Thereafter, the proceeds shall be distributed pursuant to the
Decree and the Assignment. In the event the Morris Litigation is
funded with joint funds and it is not successful, each party shall
bear his or her own losses, and there shall be no right of
contribution.
4. Conduct of Litigation with Individual Funds.
If either
Bill or Wanda declines to approve the use of Travel Company Funds
or to advance Joint Funds for the Morris Litigation, the other may
proceed with the Morris Litigation in the name of the Travel
Company, using Individual Funds.
In the event the Morris
Litigation is successful, and has been funded with Individual
Funds, the party advancing Individual Funds shall be entitled to a
return of the amounts advanced prior
to any distribution.
Thereafter, the proceeds shall be distributed pursuant to the
Decree and the Assignment. In the event the Morris Litigation is
funded with Individual Funds and is not successful, the party
advancing Individual Funds shall bear his or her own losses and
there shall be no right of contribution.
5. Conduct of Litigation Under Contingent Fee Agreement.
Bill and Wanda agree that either of them may retain an attorney to
prosecute the Morris Litigation on a contingent Eee basis,
providing the contingent fee does not exceed 33 1/3 percent, plus
costs. In the event the Morris Litigation is pursued pursuant to
this paragraph, and is successful, all proceeds after payment of
- 2 '-

attorneys fees and costs shall be distributed pursuant to the
terms of the Decree and the Assignment.
In the event the Morris
Litigation is pursued under this paragraph and is unsuccessful, if
the parties have jointly retained counsel, they shall bear the
costs 50-50; if one or the other has retained counsel on a
contingent fee basis independent of the other, that party shall
bear the costs alone, and there shall be no right of contribution.
6. Settlement; Cooperation.
Both parties must approve any
settlement of the Morris Litigation before such settlement is
binding. Bill and Wanda each agree that his/her consent shall not
be unreasonably withheld. Bill and Wanda further agree that each
will cooperate with the other in the conduct of the Morris
Litigation, and in the furnishing of records, testimony and such
other assistance as may be reasonably necessary.
7. Entire Agreement.
This Agreement contains the entire
agreement of the parties with respect to the subjects addressed
herein, and may not be modified or altered except in a writiKg
signed by both parties.
Should either party be required to
8. Attorneys Fees.
attorney
to
enforce
the provisions of this Agreement,
retain an
irrespective of whether litigation is commenced, said party shall
be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and expenses incurred in
enforcement of this agreement.
DATED this

day of February, 1987.

Wanda J. Hatton

STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On this
day of
, 1987, personally appeared
before me Wanda J. Hatton, the signer of the foregoing Agreement,
who duly acknowledged to me that she had read and executed same,
and that the contents thereof are true and correct of her own
personal knowledge.
My Commission expires
Notary Public
Residing at:

- 3 -

STATE OF

L/'} *~

)

COUNTY OF
On this ?
day of fa- u'i>?^y
t 1987, pe^GOfwrirlry appeared
before me William A. Hatton, the signer of the foregoing
Agreement/ who duly acknowledged to me that he had read and
executed same, and that the contents thereof are true and correct
of his own personal knowledge.
~
My Commission expires:
<r/*7Q lc~
Q ,/ *'< /
/ w
_

Notary Public ^
/ 'J ,
Residing at: (*Sf
A^
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APPENDIX NO. 4

5.
ASSIGNMENT
This Assignment is entered into between William A. Hatton
("Bill") and Wanda J, Hatton ("Wanda") this
day of February,
1987.
This Assignment is based upon the following facts, which are
not mere recitals, but which are stipulated to be true and form an
integral part of this Assignment:
A,. Bill and Wanda are formerly husband and wife.
B. Bill and Wanda have agreed to the terms of a Decree of
Divorce which, when fully executed, wi^l sever their marriage and
equitably distribute the real and personal property^ot the
marriage.
C. On January 21, 1987, pursuant to a stipulation
the parties, Bill and Wanda were divorced.

between

D. As part of the Decree of Divorce, Bill has agreed
execute this Assignment in favor of Wanda.

to

NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of Wanda's agreement to the
terms of the Decree of Divorce, and in compliance therewith, Bill
agrees as follows:
1. Definitions. The following definitions shall govern the
terms of this Assignment:
(a) The term "Morris Note" shall mean and refer to that
certain promissory note executed by Morris Travel Corporation
in favor of the Travel Company on or about May 1, 1985, in
the face amount of $700,000.
(b) The term "Undisputed Installments" shall mean and
refer to the installments which Morris concedes it owes under
the Morris Note, with interest, said installments being due
on the following dates and in the following amounts:
April
30, 1987 ($25,000 plus interest); July 31, 1987 ($25,000 plus
interest); October 31, 1987 ($25,000 plus interest); January
31, 1988 ($9,000 plus interest).
(c) The term "Disputed Installments" shall mean and
refer to those installments due under the Morris Note which
Morris disputes, said installments falling due beginning on
January 31, 1988, and continuing through April 30, 1990, in
the total approximate principal amount of $241,000.
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(d) The term "Earn Out Payments" shall mean and refer
to the payments to which the Travel Company may be entitled
under paragraph 3 of the agreement executed between Morris
and the Travel Company on or about April 15, 1985,
2. Assignment of Undisputed Installments.
The Decree of
Divorce requires that the Undisputed Installments together with
all the earnings thereon be deposited with an escrow to satisfy
Travel Company corporate tax obligations. To the extent there is
any surplus remaining after the Undisputed
Installments and
earnings thereon have been applied to Travel Company corporate tax
obligations, Bill hereby irrevocably assigns to Wanda any interest
he may have in the first $50,000 of such surplus, if any. After
payment of said $50,000 to Wanda, the remaining proceeds of
Undisputed Installments# if any, shall be divided evenly between
Bill and Wanda.
3. Assignment of Disputed Installments.
In the event
litigation is commenced to recover the Disputed Installments from
Morris, and such litigation is successful, the proceeds of such
litigation shall be distributed first to litigation expenses. To
the extent of any surplus after the payment of litigation
expenses, Bill hereby irrevocably assigns to Wanda any interest he
may have in the first $50,000 of any such surplus, less any
amounts Wanda has
received pursuant
to the assignment
of
Undisputed Installments under paragraph 2 hereof. After Wanda has
received a total of $50,000 from the surplus, if any, of
Undisputed Installments and Disputed Installments, the remaining
proceeds of Disputed Installments, if any, shall be divided evenly
between Bill and Wanda.
4. Assignment of Earn Outs.
All Earn Outs earned by the
Travel Company under the Morris Agreement shall be applied first
to Travel Company corporate tax obligations. To the extent there
is any surplus of- Earn Outs after payment of Travel Company
corporate tax obligations, Bill hereby irrevocably assigns to
Wanda any interest he may have in the first $50,000 of such
surplus, less the amounts Wanda may have previously received from
the surplus of Undisputed Installments and Disputed Installments,
up to a total of $50,000. After Wanda has received a total of
$50,000 from the surplus, if any, of the Undisputed Installments,
Disputed Installments, and Earn Outs, the remaining proceeds, if
any, of the Earn Outs shall be divided evenly between Bill and
Wanda.
5. Presentment to Morris.
Bill agrees that Wanda is
entitled to present this Assignment to Morris, and that such
presentment shall entitle Morris to tender all payments owed under
the Morris Note and the Morris Agreement to the trust account of
Fox, Edwards, Gardiner and Brown
("FEGB") for distribution
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pursuant to the terms of this Assignment.
Bill and Wanda agree
that upon presentment of signed and completed state and federal
corporate tax returns for the Travel Company showing the corporate
taxes owed for fiscal years ending June 30f 1986 and June 30r
1987, and evidence of payment of those obligations to the
appropriate state and federal taxing authorities, FEGB is entitled
to distribute all Disputed Funds and Earn Outs as set forth
herein. Bill and Wanda agree that the services of FEGB shall be
compensated from funds deposited with it at the normal hourly
rates of the attorneys handling the distribution of funds. In the
event of a dispute as to who is entitled to the Disputed Funds and
Earn Outs, FEGB shall be entitled to initiate an interpleader
action in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
deposit the moneys held by it with the clerk of the court, and be
absolved of any further obligation relating
to said funds. Bill
and Wanda further agree that all costs and attorneys fees incurred
by FEGB in any such interpleader action shall by paid from the
funds deposited with the clerk of the court.
6. Entire Agreement.
This agreement contains the entire
agreement of the parties with respect to the subjects addressed
herein, and may not be modified or altered except in a writing
signed by both parties.
7. Attorneys Fees.
Should either party be
retain an attorney to enforce the provisions., of this
irrespective of whether litigation is commenced, said
be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and expenses
enforcement of this Assignment.
DATED this

day of

required to
Assignment,
party shall
incurred in

, 1987.

WANDA J. HATTON

STATE OF

i//>L

)
ss

COUNTY OF

(f</r^c>^y^
On this
7
day of
1987, pet'-^tttrirty appeared
before me William A, Hatton, the signer of the foregoing
Assignment, who duly acknowledged to me that he had read and
executed same, and that the contents thereof are true and correct
of his own personal knowledge*
My Commission expires:
Notary Public
Residing at:

~C^7Z

/L
C^Ao^S*?
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STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

ss.

1987/ personally appeared
On this
day of
before me Wanda J. Hatton, the signer of the foregoing Assignment,
who duly acknowledged to me that she had read and executed same,
and that the contents thereof are true and correct of her own
personal knowledge.
My Commission expires:
Notary Public
Residing at:

APPENDIX NO. 5

EXHIBIT A
Plaintiffs' Substantive Allegations
BACKGROUND ALLEGATIONS
i[12

"In April 1985 an agreement was reached for

purchase by Morris of the assets of The Travel Company."
H14

"Morris agreed to pay The Travel Company

$700,000 for its assets,"
K15-16

"Morris [paid] $200,000 at the closing

. . . [and the] balance of the purchase price ($500,000) was
evidenced by a promissory note [attached as Exhibit B which is
payable only to The Travel Company]."
f43

"In addition to the $700,000 purchase price

. . . Morris agreed to pay certain monies to The Travel
Company in consideration of the purchase of its assets."
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Promissory Note)
K70

"Pursuant to the terms of the promissory note,

Morris is in default of its obligations to The Travel
Company."
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Purchase Agreement)
H75

"Pursuant to the terms of the Purchase

Agreement, Morris is in default of its payment obligations to
The Travel Company."
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Implied Duty Arising Out of Purchase Agreement)
K82

"The Travel Company is entitled to an order

. . . compelling Morris to account."
K8 3

"The Travel Company is also entitled to recover

all its costs."
K84

"The Travel Company is entitled to receive

payments [as a result of an accounting]•
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Promissory Note and Purchase Agreement)
^90

"Pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note

and Purchase Agreement, The Travel Company is entitled to
recover all such court costs and expenses."
FIFTH-EIGHTH CAUSES OF ACTION
(Guarantees)
11193,97,101,105

"[Guarantor] is absolutely and

unconditionally liable to The Travel Company for eleven
percent of all monies due and payable under the Purchase
Agreement and the Promissory Note."
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Accounting)
1114 "The Travel Company is entitled to an accounting
by Morris."
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